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Journal Articles International Journal of Approximate Reasoning Year : 2022

Games of Incomplete Information: a Framework Based on Belief Functions

Abstract

This paper proposes a model for incomplete games where the knowledge of the players is represented by a Dempster-Shafer belief function. Beyond an extension of the classical definitions, it shows such a game can be transformed into an equivalent hypergraphical complete game (without uncertainty), thus generalizing Howson and Rosenthal's theorem to the framework of belief functions and to any number of players. The complexity of this transformation is finally studied and shown to be polynomial in the degree of k-additivity of the mass function.
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Dates and versions

hal-03658700 , version 1 (04-05-2022)
hal-03658700 , version 2 (21-09-2022)

Identifiers

Cite

Pierre Pomeret-Coquot, Hélène Fargier, Érik Martin-Dorel. Games of Incomplete Information: a Framework Based on Belief Functions. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 2022, 151, pp.182-204. ⟨10.1016/j.ijar.2022.09.010⟩. ⟨hal-03658700v2⟩
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