%0 Conference Proceedings %T Auctioning airport slots (?) %+ ENAC - Laboratoire d'Economie et d'Econométrie de l'Aérien (LEEA) %A Gruyer, Nicolas %A Lenoir, Nathalie %< avec comité de lecture %( ATRS 2003, Air Transport Research Society World Conference %B ATRS 2003, Air Transport Research Society World Conference %C Toulouse, France %P pp xxxx %8 2003-07-10 %D 2003 %K slots %K airports %K licence %K auctions %K combinatorial %Z Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinanceConference papers %X The current allocation of slots on congested European airports constitutes an obstacle to the effective liberalisation of air transportation undertaken in Europe. With a view to favouring efficient slot utilisation and competition, as is the goal of the European commission, we propose to use a market mechanism, based on temporary utilisation licences. In order to allocate those licences, we propose and describe an iterated combinatorial auction mechanism where a percentage of licences would be reallocated each season. A secondary market would also be set up in order to reallocate slots during a season. Since a combinatorial auction involve a complex optimisation procedure, we describe how it can be made to work in the case of auctions. %G English %2 https://enac.hal.science/hal-01021718/document %2 https://enac.hal.science/hal-01021718/file/184.pdf %L hal-01021718 %U https://enac.hal.science/hal-01021718 %~ SHS %~ ENAC %~ AO-ECONOMIE %~ LEEA