%0 Journal Article %T The ex ante α-core for normal form games with uncertainty %+ Chercheur indépendant %+ ENAC - Laboratoire de Mathématiques Appliquées, Informatique et Automatique pour l'Aérien (MAIAA) %+ Laboratoire de Mathématiques Pures et Appliquées [Tizi-Ouzou] (LMPA) %A Askoura, Youcef %A Sbihi, Mohammed %A Tikobaini, Hamid %< avec comité de lecture %@ 0304-4068 %J Journal of Mathematical Economics %I Elsevier %V 49 %N 2 %P pp 157-162 %8 2013-03-01 %D 2013 %R 10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.01.007 %K α-core %K game with incomplete information %K normal form games %K behavioral strategies %K game with uncertainty %Z Mathematics [math]/Optimization and Control [math.OC] %Z Computer Science [cs]/Operations Research [cs.RO] %Z Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinanceJournal articles %X In this paper we study the existence of the α-core for an n-person game with incomplete information. We follow a Milgrom-Weber-Balder formulation of a game with incomplete information. The players adopt behavioral strategies represented by Young measures. The game unrolls in one step at the ex ante stage. In this context, the mixed-extensions of the utility functions are not quasi-concave, and as a result the classical Scarf's theorem cannot be applied. An approximation argument is used to overcome this lack of concavity. %G English %2 https://enac.hal.science/hal-00924267/document %2 https://enac.hal.science/hal-00924267/file/Sbihi_JME2013.pdf %L hal-00924267 %U https://enac.hal.science/hal-00924267 %~ SHS %~ ENAC %~ AO-ECONOMIE %~ INSMI %~ MAIAA %~ MAIAA-OPTIM %~ TDS-MACS